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Abstract
This paper explores the use of system modelling as an approach for appraising critical infrastructure systems. It
reports on focus group findings with relation to the system modelling aspects of a critical infrastructure security
analysis and modelling framework. Specifically, this discussion focuses on the interpretations of a focus group in
terms of the likely benefits or otherwise of system visualisation. With the group focusing on its perceived value as an
educational tool in terms of providing an abstract visualisation representation of a critical infrastructure system
incident.
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INTRODUCTION
The complexity and interconnection of modern critical infrastructure systems and their associated dependency issues
raises a number of considerations with relation to undertaking security analysis and modelling of critical
infrastructure systems. This research focuses specifically on the utilisation of system modelling as a means of
producing a visualisation of the system structure, architecture, function and its perceived value or otherwise as an
educational tool.
Initially, a discussion regarding modelling of critical infrastructure systems is undertaken to scope the issues of
modelling such systems as a prelude to reviewing and reporting the findings of a focus group. In this research
instance, Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) was the applied system modelling approach used to develop an abstract
visualisation of the subject system utilising CPNTools (Jensen 2008) software.
Specifically, this paper reports on the outcomes and subsequent determinations of a focus group conducted to
analyse and appraise a practical application utilising the security analysis and system modelling approach of the
TARDIS framework (Pye & Warren 2009). The intention of the focus group was to examine and critique the CPN
applied system modelling aspect of the TARDIS framework, as applied to a case study of a critical infrastructure
system incident.
However, it is not the intention to discuss in detail the applied case study, but to report the merit of modelling a
critical infrastructure system incident as a means of visualising the system status at various stages. Therefore, this
paper is pursuant to reporting the focus group findings and the merit of utilising system visualisation via CPN
modelling with CPNTools, of a critical infrastructure system incident.

MODELLING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCUTRE SYSTEMS
The functional complexity and interconnectedness of today’s critical infrastructure systems and their structural
information systems and communication networks, poses many challenges to modelling and analysing their security
aspects. Particularly, in terms of interpreting the survivability, reliability and resilience characteristics of critical
infrastructure systems and the services they provide to modern society. In essence it is the heterogeneous system
environment and the interactive nature of these systems that presents several theoretical and practical challenges to
modelling, predicting, simulating and analysing the causal behaviours and security factors. Additionally, the
influence of external environmental factors and the potential impacts of interdependency relationships as
infrastructures evolve and change in structure, or changing operational regulations governing critical infrastructure
systems, are all important considerations (Brown et al 2004). As the interactions and responses are neither
universally applicable nor transferable between independent, single critical infrastructure systems or interconnected
multiple system configurations. The fact remains that critical infrastructure systems comprise a heterogeneous

mixture of dynamic, interactive, non-linear elements, unscheduled discontinuations and numerous other influential
impositions and behaviours (Macdonald & Bologna 2003).
The challenges of analysing and modelling such large-scale systems, including their dependency relationships with
other systems and their non-linear and time-dependent behaviour, remain largely undetermined or ill defined.
According to McDonald and Bologna (ibid), mathematical models of critical infrastructure systems are vague and
there are no applicable methodologies for assessing and comprehending the intricacies of critical infrastructure
systems. Then add to this the effects of human interaction and the susceptibility to instigate failure or adaptively
recover and manage wayward systems and it becomes self-evident, the difficulty of producing a concise system
visualisation.
Therefore, developing a representative system modelling that provides an acceptable visualisation of the subject
system requires a deeper contextual understanding of the system, in order to effectively scope the system under
investigation. This is not merely about just modelling the topology and dynamics of these large complex network
systems, but incorporating the consequential rationality of human thinking, responses and reactions (Macdonald &
Bologna 2003, Peters et al 2008). Moreover, there are additional complexity factors with network systems that are
inherently difficult to comprehend (McDonald & Bologna 2003):


Structural complexity – increasing number of nodes and links between nodes;



Network evolution – the structural linkage which could change over time;



Connection diversity – the links between nodes could have different weightings, directions or capacities;



Dynamical complexity – the nodes could be non-linear dynamical systems;



Node diversity – there could be many different node types; and



Meta-complication – the various complications can influence other network nodes.

Additionally, critical infrastructures can be intractable systems that are difficult to manage, operate with consistency
and maintain. They are typically large, physical and geographically distributed systems that are highly diverse and
networked, consisting of system within system structures with respective performance variations. There are few
system modelling tools that can characterise these infrastructures as whole or decompose the system structures
(Schulman & Roe 2007).
Yet critical infrastructure analysis and modelling utilising simulation and optimisation-based techniques have played
a part in examining potential interdiction options, through providing insights to mitigate facility loss and enable
prioritisation of security strengthening efforts. Thereby system modelling simulation as an optimisation technique
has proven invaluable in the analysing vulnerabilities through the examination of a range of applied impacts, with
either implicit or explicit notions of optimising performance (Murray & Grubesic 2007).
Therefore, in the context of assessing system reliability and vulnerability through monitoring the simulation models
of network nodes or links that are compromised, this enables corresponding changes in connectivity or performance
to be visualised and documented. Although a final important consideration is the interdependency relationships that
exist between differing critical infrastructure systems. Mussington (2002) identifies these relationships as a point at
which a shortfall of knowledge for improving critical infrastructure security capabilities is incomplete and suggests
that part of the problem is the complexity of relationships that is difficult to model. However, system modelling is a
first step in analysing and answering persistent questions about the ‘real’ vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure
systems (Brown et al 2004).
Therefore, it is the intention to seek to determine the merits of system modelling as a visualisation approach towards
delivering discernable understanding and comprehension, with regard to analysing the security and functional
aspects of critical infrastructure systems.

FOCUS GROUP RATIONALE
The principle rationale of the focus group was to validate the TARDIS framework and discover the suitability or
otherwise of undertaking security analysis and modelling of the applied critical infrastructure system incident. The
intent was to gather feedback in terms of incident response management, contingency planning and to elicit
responses with regard to emergency management education and training approaches.

The composition of the focus group consisted of five invited participants who voluntarily consented to take part
anonymously. The opinions, comments and interpretations captured in the moderated discussion undertaken during
the focus group, consist of participant feedback from the perspective of an Australian federal government agency.

FOCUS GROUP OVERVIEW
The focus group comprised of two parts: the first consisted of presenting an explanation of the TARDIS framework
system modelling intent and function, including a presentation of the critical infrastructure system incident case
study. This was necessary to provide clarity and context along with enabling participants to ask any questions. The
second part of the focus group was a moderated discussion inviting participants to review and critique system
modelling aspect of the TARDIS framework, utilising CPNTools. The purpose of the moderated discussion was to
capture and record participant comments and opinions with a view to examining the captured data to determine
framework validation in this context.

FOCUS GROUP REVIEW FINDINGS
The review findings are the product of focus group responses to the TARDIS framework in consideration of the
critical infrastructure incident case study. The data points relate directly to the following discussion themes:
1.

Application of the TARDIS Framework;

2.

TARDIS System Models;

3.

Education and Training Factors; and

4.

Strategic Management.

The collation of comments with regard to each theme forms the basis of the expanded discussions and
determinations relating to each point and particular discussion theme.
Application of the TARDIS Framework
This moderated discussion theme focuses solely on the system modelling component of the TARDIS framework
utilising CPNTools. It centres on the perceived value or otherwise of the system representation and visualisation
approach used from an emergency management educational training perspective.
Initial interpretation
Participants were generally positive in their views regarding the system modelling, particularly in its suitability for
systematically critiquing network-like critical infrastructure systems, in-depth case study development approaches
and drill-down aspects including the decomposition of system models. Furthermore, the system visualisation offered
an incident auditing approach suitable for investigating aspects of responsibility and decision-making, which would
be invaluable for post-incident system analysis and as a critique for later educational and training purposes.
Summary findings
In terms of the usefulness of the system modelling, participants were of the belief that as a system diagnostic and
network modelling tool, CPNTools was useful in providing an analysis and diagrammatical representation of an
historical case study. Additionally, participants found they could appreciate the structure, functions and pinpoint the
system problems, with one participant suggesting that the TARDIS framework had a possible business continuity
planning application. Furthermore, participants thought the system modelling approach had a powerful ‘storytelling’
aspect in the context of visualising the system and its lower-level subsystems and components. In fact one of the
aspects of the TARDIS framework system modelling approach that participants recognised as an important and
valuable feature was the capability for decomposing the system in both the analysis and modelling phases. This
enabled the examination of the system at differing levels of detail from an overall system perspective to an isolated
view of the critical infrastructure system. Participants noted that system decomposition aspects of CPNTools within
the TARDIS framework were a strength that had the potential to deliver valuable insights and understanding through
its visual system representation.
Other strengths were that the system modelling delivered a means of auditing an incident that would enable scrutiny
when reviewing decisions taken, to analyse their impact and consequences in response to the incident. As one
participant explained, this was essential to investigating decision accountability and incident management responses,
particularly with the private ownership of critical infrastructure systems and the responsibility for actions taken.

Therefore, reviewing incident response practices is important to improving the decision-making process and
interpreting the appropriate responses and actions.
Additionally, participants were positive in their assessment of the system modelling capability to decompose the
system to its lower-level structures and functions in terms of visualising aspects of security analysis, scenario
development and system composition. Participants felt this feature delivered crucial insights into the architectural,
structural, functional and incident location from a more visual and abstract perspective.
Furthermore, participants felt that system modelling aspect of the TARDIS framework would be very helpful for
educational and training purposes in disaster response, contingency planning, emergency management and
coordination. In terms of identifiable weaknesses, participants remarked that there was a lack of temporal feedback,
particularly in the system model simulations. Event timings as an overlay, would illustrate the case study system
changes over the timeframe of the critical infrastructure system incident, thus providing an appreciation of what
happened and when. Participants felt this was a particularly important aspect, as time is a critical influence in
incident response decisions in terms of the status of the system. Additionally, participants felt that the incorporation
of incident timing would enhance the teaching and learning aspects for emergency management training purposes
too. As mapping incident timeframes to changing system status dynamics is particularly valuable in comprehending
what happened and when, especially while reviewing an incident. However, time was not a feature of this case
study, but it remains a consideration for future incorporation in critical infrastructure system case studies.
Another weakness participants identified was that the CPN system modelling approach would not be particularly
suited to analysing and modelling critical infrastructure incidents that were non-linear in nature. The problem is that
the unpredictability of an evolving system incident consisting of multiple variables with multiple values would be
difficult to interpret, than would otherwise be the case with a linear system event instance. Although, there is
acknowledgement that there are interpretive compromises made in analysing and modelling with CPNTools to
develop any visual representation of a critical infrastructure system incident.
An important aspect of the moderated discussion was the application of CPN system modelling within the TARDIS
framework, was in the context of its suitability as a pre-incident or post-incident analysis tool. Participant views
were diverse, with some believing there was merit in applying the system modelling approach in a pre-incident
context to hypothetically ascertain, plan and develop appropriate future incident responses, based on the lessons
learnt from past events. Other participants thought the approach was better suited to a direct post-incident analysis.
Enabling the review of an incident as it unfolded to interpret or identify the effectiveness or otherwise of existing
incident contingency plans. Either approach of the TARDIS framework’s system modelling aspect had its
advantages and disadvantages, although participants generally believed that it was better suited to looking at critical
infrastructure system incidents from a historical perspective.
Although there was scope for the predictive use of the TARDIS approach, the consensus was that its main strength
lay in the analysis and modelling of critical infrastructure system incidents using historical case studies. The
reasoning was that the TARDIS approach offered a means of formally undertaking numerous historical, complex
system analyses that could determine likely decisions and courses of action taken. This would then enable
contingency and disaster planners to appraise and reconfirm the decisions and actions taken during the event. This
approach would identify weaknesses within the contingency response procedures and the actions taken during the
incident. The outcome would enable the implementation of incremental changes to improve response measures and
actions including decision-making processes, to establish better emergency response systems in the future. This is
not to say that the TARDIS approach is not applicable to developing predictive outcomes as applied to hypothetical
system incidents. However, it was felt that its strength lay in using system visualisations from a storytelling,
educational and training perspective to analyse and model critical infrastructure system incidents after their
occurrence.
The feature of system decomposition within the modelling representations of the case study incident was a powerful
feature of the CPNTools system modelling software. This provided clarity and comprehension to the focus group
participants in terms of system architecture, structure, functionality, causal location and the consequential aspect of
the incident. However, as participants suggested, the incorporation of temporal aspects as an overlay would
demonstrate the changing characteristics of the system that would further enhance the visual practicality of system
modelling and the subsequent simulation aspects. As an aside to the incorporation of time into the system models,
there is a capability within CPN modelling for the incorporation of time into system model representations. In this
instance, the consideration and inclusion of specific event timings within CPN system models was beyond the scope
of this case study.

TARDIS System Models
This part of the moderated focus group discussion focused exclusively on the system modelling aspects and the
visual representations developed in CPNTools utilising the principles of CPN system modelling.
Initial interpretation
The participant’s responses to the system modelling capabilities (CPNTools) were very positive in terms of
comprehending the system models, their structure and the capability to apply a system simulation to provide a
deeper comprehension of system interactions and service delivery. Participants suggested that this system modelling
approach also had further applications for producing meaningful visualisations related to modelling organisational
contingencies. Particularly, human communication networks, decision-making structures and disaster management
communication, particularly in educational and training terms for business organisations, local government, and
state and federal government agencies.
Summary findings
The participants generally found CPN system models (using CPNTools) easy to follow and were able to
comprehend what was happening within the system simulations and, more importantly could see the location of the
causal system incident failure including the consequences. Additionally, participants felt the decomposition of
system models into subsystem layers and components particularly helpful for comprehending complex structures
and functions of the system, and enabling an enhanced explanation that was easy to follow and appreciate.
Furthermore, a participant suggested that depending on the target audience and information required, the modelling
aspect could offer managers an illustration of what can go wrong and the consequences. Additionally, it may provide
system designers with information and feedback about the proposed system prior to construction and
implementation, or to enhance training and educational exercises for emergency response management and
contingency planning.
Participants thought the system simulation feature of CPNTools system modelling was a very powerful aspect of the
TARDIS framework, as it enabled them to appreciate visually the broader impacts and consequences to the
community and business organisations. This coupled with the ability to drill-down and decompose the system to
observe and isolate the system model at the subsystem and component level, was a valuable feature that assisted in
enhancing their understanding and appreciation of the case study. Especially from the perspective of describing the
interconnections with other associated systems and that the implementation of changes to model simulations enables
users to see other speculative consequential outcomes of the system model. Participants expressed the opinion that
these simulations offered valuable outcomes in the education and training environment, as students could see and
speculate upon appropriate emergency responses and decision-making within the CPN system modelling
environment.
In summary, the focus group was positive in response to the system modelling approach and capabilities of the
TARDIS framework, utilising CPNTools software as the system modelling environment. Furthermore, participants
suggested extending this approach to modelling and mapping communication networks within organisations or
businesses would prove useful for emergency management planning. Finally, they felt the system modelling
approach was especially powerful in a visual sense for education and training purposes.
Education and Training Factors
The focus group were further asked to express opinions regarding the potential educational and training factors
related to producing abstract visualisations of critical infrastructure system models.
Initial interpretation
The initial interpretation of the suitability of the system modelling visualisation approach utilised in the TARDIS
framework is that it offers potential, in terms of security analysis and system modelling suitability for case study
based training and instructional exercises. Participants thought this would prove useful for aiding the educational
and training aspects of contingency planning and disaster recovery management. However, just where the focus lies
requires further specifically targeted research and investigation to determine the application and likely benefits of
using abstract visualisations of critical infrastructure systems in an educational context.

Summary findings
The intent of this discussion theme was to elicit comments regarding various impressions of the potential
educational and training aspects of visually modelling critical infrastructure system incidents. Particularly, as the
focus group participants’ expertise lay in education and training within the area of emergency management and
contingency planning, it was therefore important to investigate its potential as an educational and training tool. A
number of diverse views were expressed with regard to the potential usefulness of system modelling visualisation
via CPNTools as an educational and training tool. This was from their expert perspective of educational trainers of
emergency management and contingency planning and thus applied to analysing and modelling critical
infrastructure system incidents. However, it was the consensus that further investigation and research to establish the
TARDIS framework’s applicability as a tool for system modelling visualisation for education and training purposes,
was required.
Strategic Management
In an additional consideration, the focus group was asked to consider the system modelling and visualisation aspects
of the TARDIS framework in terms of the strategic management from their perspective of emergency management
education and training.
Initial interpretation
The intention was to seek participant thoughts on the extendibility of the TARDIS framework and its potential for
delivering strategic management outcomes. Participants felt that the TARDIS approach would value-add to the
development of strategic contingency plans for business organisations, through visualisation modelling and analysis
of their crucial systems. However, it was deemed that this requires further research to assess this definitively.
Summary findings
One participant thought that although this was not the primary focus, its application did offer potential for
identifying strategic management options in an operational context. This opinion was in the context of an
operational team undertaking a review of the sequence of events that occurred within a particular critical
infrastructure system incident to determine their significance. Additionally, another participant suggested that this
would enable the operational team to appreciate the relationship between what they do and the system, particularly
in consideration of action timeframes and how their communication structures and systems function under stress.
The outcome of this type of assessment would enable operational teams to identify model and implement strategic
management initiatives for improved cooperation, coordination and streamlining of their operational approach for
the future.
Further to the potential for identifying strategic management initiatives through system visualisation modelling via
the TARDIS framework. The focus group felt that the approach would simplify system complexity through
decomposition that to an extent may ‘demystify’ what actually occurs during an event and enhance incident
appreciation. Strategically, this may be used as a teaching and learning resource tool to augment the development of
individual decision-making skills, communication structures and incident management procedures necessary for
delivering strategic and measured responses to future unexpected incidents. At this point, a participant highlighted
that through the applied system modelling approach, it was visually obvious from a reliance perspective as to which
of the geographically distant communities were directly impacted by the incident. The participants felt this would be
very useful strategically in explaining and illustrating to system managers, owners and operators the importance of
system availability and service provision to the wider community.
Participants also felt that the visualisation of the system would value-add to the development of strategic
contingency plans for business organisations through analysing and modelling their crucial systems. This would
therefore enable businesses or government agencies to prioritise and strategically allocate resources to minimise the
impact of an unexpected incident. Thereby potentially reducing any system downtime, loss of data or information
and perhaps reduce the economic affects to governments, business, staff and community.
Finally, in terms of governmental recovery management, participants thought the TARDIS approach would be an
especially useful tool for undertaking reflective analysis after the event. Particularly utilising visualisation through
system modelling to investigate and map the strategic communication pathways from government to individuals
within affected communities. Especially, in terms of communicating essential information to community members
before or after a significant emergency event to effectively manage the response and recovery processes to get the
resources to where they are needed.

This discussion theme elicited views and interpretations of the extensibility of the TARDIS framework system
modelling approach in terms of identifying its possible adaptability to identifying, visualising and determining
strategic management indicators that would be applicable to critical infrastructure system managers, owners and
operators. Although, this was a digression for participants, away from considering the TARDIS framework as a
security analysis and modelling tool for critical infrastructure system incidents. Focus group participants felt there
was scope for extending and applying the TARDIS framework system modelling in relation to strategic management
approaches that would be applicable to a number of levels. These included reviewing system managerial and
incident response management and planning, through to strategically managing the processes and structures of
communication with the community, in both pre-incident planning and post-incident recovery management contexts.

FOCUS GROUP CONCLUSIONS
The comments and opinions were constructive and reflected favourably on the benefits and outcomes of the system
modelling aspect of the TARDIS framework as an approach for visualising and modelling of a critical infrastructure
system incident. This was primarily evident in the favourable responses of the initial moderated discussion theme
and further evidenced in subsequent themes in terms of system modelling, the decomposition feature of CPNTools
and the added diagrammatical dimensions of the system simulation aspects.
Another important conclusion was the reaffirmation of applying the TARDIS framework to historical case study
incidents, although it was recognised that the framework was potentially applicable to hypothetical situations and
predictive outcomes. Focus group participants felt the real strength and value lay in system modelling after the
incident had occurred from a ‘lessons learnt’ perspective. In the context of an education and training tool, the
opinion was that the system visualisation aspect of the TARDIS framework would value-add in the environment of
education and training. This would be achieved by presenting alternative interpretations of incidents to develop
analysis skills, understanding, comprehension and intuition of the potential consequences for critical infrastructure
system failures.
Participants identified the TARDIS framework’s relevance and suitability for case study system modelling depiction
and suggested that it would also be suitable for analysing and visually modelling communication networks.
Furthermore, the identification of strategic management issues had potential benefits for areas including: business
contingency planning; emergency management response planning; emergency services; communication analysis and
disaster recovery management of critical infrastructure systems in the Australian context.

SYSTEM VISUALISATION OUTCOMES
The primary outcome of this focus group investigation was that the visualisation of critical infrastructure system
incident through system modelling offers an insight into developing greater understanding of the situation for system
security and other analysis purposes.
The analysis and modelling of critical infrastructure systems also offers the potential to determine interdependencies
that are susceptible to cascading failures and identifying the divergent systems characteristics likely to exacerbate
such interconnected infrastructure failures. Particularly, where the consumption of services is virtually immediate
and no buffering or reserve of resources exists within infrastructures. This is particularly evident in
telecommunications and electricity grids, where the immediacy of resource consumption can lead to potentially
instantaneous cascading failures that impact other interdependent critical infrastructure systems. Alternatively, other
infrastructures exhibit buffering characteristics similar to fuel and gas production and distribution infrastructures
where physical supply resources have a level of reserve. Within these systems failure would not necessarily be
instantaneous, but the effects would exacerbate over time (Svendsen & Wolthusen 2007).
The differences in scenario characteristics and the characteristics of the critical infrastructure systems involved
would by necessity require careful consideration in any modelling context. Particularly, when seeking to identify,
predict and even quantify the effects of cascading incidents among interdependent infrastructure systems with regard
to public policies that aim to address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and especially that relate to critical
infrastructure system security (Zimmerman & Restrepo 2006).
According to Little (2003), applying analysis and modelling techniques to historical critical infrastructure incidents
and events enables incremental improvements in prediction, forecasting and preparedness for future events and
allows the instigation of new engineering approaches to design and construction. This enables critical infrastructure

systems to become more robust to withstand the rigours of natural hazards, crippling failures, accidents and
incidents as they occur in the future.
Due to the increasing importance of secure critical infrastructure systems, there is an effort to develop analysis and
modelling approaches that can accurately model critical infrastructure system behaviour, identify interdependencies
and vulnerabilities to various threats. Some of the potential outcomes of analysis and modelling simulation
approaches to assessing critical infrastructure systems may prove beneficial to governments, government agencies,
military planning and defence and community expansion plans. This may reduce costs, enhance critical system
redundancy, improve traffic flow, secure data and information protection and enable better preparation for and
response to emergencies (Pederson et al 2006).
Although in the context of Australian critical infrastructure system characteristics, there are modelling
considerations that are particular to the visualisation of critical infrastructure systems. However, the ability to model
these systems utilising a visual medium such as CPNTools, does offer another alternative that may provide
invaluable insights into the security assessment and analysis of critical infrastructure system incidents.

CONCLUSION
The private and public owners in the infrastructure industry now have heightened security obligations with regard to
the Australian national security status. This includes maintaining critical infrastructure system availability and
supply of services to industry, business and the wider community, who are increasingly dependent and reliant on
critical infrastructure systems. Further compounding this is the increasing interconnectedness between
infrastructures via the information communication technologies that are increasingly pervading into these systems
and therefore creating new interactions, interdependencies and dependency relationships. These technological
innovations have thus introduced new risks and vulnerabilities enabling decentralised utility supply, distributed,
autonomous control of network operations and information sharing provided by multifunctional information and
communication infrastructures.
The collection of interactive change processes in the Australian infrastructure industry is creating a new generation
of critical infrastructures. These systems are so interwoven with new technologies that traditional approaches to
managing spatial planning, policy making, regulation, technological, information and communication, physical and
cyber security require rethinking. Similarly, governments and owners and operators must consider their interactions
and connections with other critical and non-critical infrastructure systems. This is particularly relevant in terms of
capacity allocation, service provision, system availability, planning and security as a function of changing economic,
environmental and regulatory conditions.
Therefore, understanding critical infrastructure system behaviour and security implications, vulnerabilities and
mitigating identified security risks is a current concern of many nations, including Australia. In terms of a system
thinking perspective, comprehending the design, operation, management and ultimately the security of any critical
infrastructure system is important to conceptualising the system, its goals and performance. This applies equally to
all differing levels of the greater system structure including the behaviour of the identified subsystems. Hence the
ability to visualise the system through applied modelling techniques as discussed here, offers one approach to
appraising critical infrastructure systems with visualisation.
As Bentley (2006) intimates, critical infrastructure systems tend to be interdependent and even interconnected and
systems failure – be it through natural disaster, accident or poor management – can bring entire communities and
their industries and utilities to a grinding halt. Just imagine, for example, a major electricity failure, which these
days can bring just about everything to a stop, from transport to workplaces, water supplies, telecommunications and
transport hubs that would cause widespread disruption and damage. Therefore, the ability to analyse and critique the
security aspects of critical infrastructure systems, together with modelling these systems visually, offers an avenue
for assessing critical infrastructure system security and identifying vulnerabilities. Through locating these inherent
weaknesses, appropriate solutions and remedial actions can be appraised and implemented to mitigate security risks
to system availability and service supply.
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